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Abstract 
23 
Nearly all studies of the impact of government subsidies on the transit industry 
have excluded systems with rail transit. Tims, previous findings cannot simply be ex-
tended to transit systems in major metropolitan areas. As a preliminary step in ad-
dressing the issue of subsidies and large transit systems, this paper presellts historical 
information on the financial state of the two largest transit systems in the US.-
Chicago s CTA and New York'.\· NYCT. In addition, the subsidies to each system are 
broken down by level of governmelll-federal, state, and local. The patterns for the 
two systems are quite differellf. The CTA remained in relative financial health longer 
than the NYCT. While the CTA :~ operating expenses have stabilized recently, its rider-
ship levels (and revenues) have declined shwply. !11 terms of subsidies, the CTA re-
ceives most of these funds at the regional. not state or local. level. In collfrast, NYCTs 
revenues were actually greater in 1995 than they were in 1954 (in constant dollars). 
Howeve1; its operating costs ballooned throughout the 1980s and only recent(v have been 
contained. Subsidies to the NYCT come almost equal(v fivm state and local sources. 
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Introduction: Issues Surrounding Transit Subsidies 
This paper revisits the issue of mass transit subsidies. 1 Transit subsidies 
have been controversial from the inception of the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act of 1964. Since mass transit is generally viewed as an industry experiencing 
sharp declines in ridership, but also an industry that still serves essential social 
functions, people have lined up on both sides of the subsidy issue. Proponents of 
transit argue that preserving transit is a way of preserving the environment. They 
also stress relief from traffic congestion as a benefit of continued transit. In 
general, however, they pay more attention to equity rather than efficiency issues, 
and their focus is on social, rather than economic, benefits. Others are skeptical 
that the benefits of transit outweigh the costs of subsidization. In fact, many 
critics argue that subsidies (particularly operating subsidies) have themselves 
exacerbated the problem by reducing the productivity of transit systems. 
If one does accept the rationales for subsidization, the next issue is whether 
these transit systems should be supported through capital grants or operating 
assistance or both. It is worth noting that government assistance for capital im-
provements has generally been more palatable to politicians, since capital grants 
are not perceived as open-ended. From the beginnings of federal aid to transit 
systems, economists warned that providing operating assistance would in es-
sence be opening a Pandora's box, leading to the dissipation of these grants through 
"labor demands and by wasteful managerial practices" (Hilton 1984: 8). Indeed, 
operating subsidies were not authorized until 1974 and not without a great struggle 
on the part of transit advocates in Congress. 
In addition, it is also necessary to distinguish between subsidies provided 
by the different levels of government-federal, state and local. While transit 
operating subsidies are usually discussed as if they were a purely federal respon-
sibility, there is significant state and local support across the industry (38 per-
cent of total revenues come from fares, 4.5 percent from non-transit sources, 31 
percent from local government, 21.5 percent from state government, and only 5 
percent from the federal government) (APIA 1996). However, there are wide 
variations in levels of local support. Smaller systems are typically more depen-
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dent upon federal aid than the aggregate figures suggest. Also, these figures do 
not include capital grants, where the federal government typically covers 80 per-
cent of the costs. 
Indeed, some people might agree that transit merited government support, 
but that it should be a local, not federal, responsibility. Many argue local govern-
ment is better able to determine the wishes of the citizenry regarding transit 
support. The economists Shughart and Kimenyi ( 1991) believed that imposing 
more of the burden of financing capital expansion of transit systems on local 
authorities would result in more realistic projects, as well as more political ac-
countability for transportation decisions. However, when looking at equity con-
cerns associated with subsidies, Pucher and Hirschman ( 1981) calculated that 
using federal taxes was a more progressive method overall of financing rapid 
transit than using local taxes. 
Perhaps the most daunting criticism is that transit subsidies have actually 
worsened the financial situation of mass transit agencies. For instance, Pucher, 
Markstedt, and Hirschman ( 1983) calculated that subsidies in and of themselves 
exacerbated cost increases in rapid transit, particularly labor costs. They criti-
cized the fact that federal transit policy did not tie subsidies to specific goals or 
to realistic evaluations of transit needs. Shughart and Kimenyi found, like Pucher, 
Markstedt and Hirschman, that transit costs rose dramatically when federal sub-
sidies were available. Lave ( 1991) takes a similarly negative view of federal 
transit subsidies. 
This author contends that the subsidy issue is more complex than these 
studies have indicated. Indeed, the prior studies base their results on aggregate 
data, obscuring crucial distinctions between systems, such as size. In fact, much 
research on mass transit specifically excludes agencies that operate rail transit in 
order to focus on the typical transit agency. While there is some merit in this 
approach, it is irresponsible to then make sweeping claims about the impact of 
subsidies. In addition to industry-wide studies, one must analyze individual tran-
sit systems and their historical financial performance, particularly in the case of 
large multi-mode systems. Thus, this paper will present detailed information on 
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the financial history, including subsidy levels, of the two largest transit systems 
in the United States: New York and Chicago. These transit properties are neither 
typical nor representative of the industry. However, New York City Transit (NYCT) 
and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) are an extremely significant part of the 
transit picture, together accounting for 27 percent of all transit trips in the U.S. 
Subsidies to Transit 
While it is tempting to view transit subsidies as something new, as early as 
the 19th century, various governmental bodies frequently ceded land for right-
of-ways to transportation firms in order to persuade them to build in certain 
areas. Occasionally, additional land was provided to transportation firms with 
the intent that they would sell it to finance construction. Then, as now, transpor-
tation was viewed as necessary to stimulate regional development and other in-
vestment. Canals, railroads, mass transit lines and, of course, the interstate high-
way system were all built at least partly through government largesse. Even after 
these initial "capital grants," transportation firms have occasionally been given 
aid (either state or federal) to carry out specific projects. For instance, in Chi-
cago, the WPA provided much of the funding for the construction of the State 
Street subway. Several other route extensions received federal funding prior to 
1960. This support was not certainly unique to Chicago. 
However, this aid had not been part of a systematic federal commitment to 
mass transit. Federal capital assistance had been somewhat sporadic and not a 
particularly reliable source of funding. The new era for transit subsidies came in 
1964, with the passage of the Urban Mass Transportation Act. It is probably not 
a coincidence that this new commitment occurred at roughly the same time as 
the transit industry as a whole went into the red (Hilton 1974). The federal capi-
tal program grew rapidly; the cumulative total of federal capital grants from 
1961 to 1996 exceeded $60 billion. 
Federal operating assistance was first authorized in 197 4 and was extremely 
controversial at the time. However, it too became routine. As part of the political 
balancing act by transit supporters, operating assistance-originally allocated as 
Section 5 Grants-was split into Urbanized and Nonurbanized Area Formula 
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Grants. As critics feared (and proponents hoped) would happen, operating assis-
tance also increased dramatically throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By 1995, the 
cumulative total appropriations for urban operating assistance alone reached $16.5 
billion. The commitment to operating assistance has never been particularly strong, 
however, and federal operating subsidies are slated to be phased out by 1999. It 
is less clear what will happen to capital subsidies in the future, since transporta-
tion funding is supposed to be made somewhat more flexible under ISTEA. The 
states should be able to allocate their grants between transit and highways in the 
manner that best suits the needs of their citizens. 
Clearly, we are in a new phase in the transit debate, where transit is again 
conceived of as largely a local responsibility. This will definitely lead to a greater 
reliance upon state and local sources of subsidy. In major cities with densities 
that make mass transit feasible, transit service will continue, though it may be 
scaled back. New York and Chicago, the two largest systems, certainly face a 
very different set of constraints than do smaller systems. They have farebox 
recovery rates that hover around 50 percent of operating expenses, but since 
their expenses are so large compared to the smaller systems, a large commitment 
from some government source is required to make up the difference. 
Financial Data 
The data were gathered primarily from Section 15 Reports or the Annual 
Reports of the two systems and occasionally supplemented by internal docu-
ments from the two systems. The transition from Annual Reports to Section 15 
was not perfect. The data in the 1970s (and, indeed, the first few years of Section 
15 data) frequently contain questionable values, which have to be checked or 
calculated from other information. In the Section 15 Reports, fare differentials-
occasionally categorized as revenues and sometimes as subsidies-have simply 
been included with operating assistance after 1982. This posed a serious dilemma 
in terms of maintaining consistency. In Figures 1 and 2, fare differentials have 
been incorporated with operating assistance for all years. In Figures 3 and 4, fare 
differentials are reported separately until 1982, at which point they are folded 
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into the operating assistance from the appropriate governmental body. In effect, 
fare differentials have been added to state subsidy levels in Chicago and to local 
subsidies in New York. Finally, the history of New York City Transit makes it 
particularly difficult to ensure one is measuring the same things every year. 
Whenever possible, NYCT figures were kept separate from those of its subsid-
iary, the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority. However, 
these systems appear to have been consolidated in the mid 1980s (in the reports 
at least), perhaps as the result of another reorganization of the Metropolitan Transit 
Authority. In likelihood, this accounts for some portion of New York's increasing 
operating expenses after 1981. 
Financial History of the CTA 
The CTA was established in 1945 to take over the provision of transit from 
several bankrupt transit companies. It began providing service in 194 7, after 
issuing bonds that were to be financed from passenger revenues. In 1952, CTA 
bought up the local bus company and became the only transit operator in Chi-
cago. It was expected to break even, covering not only its operating expenses but 
also its debt service requirements (the cost of originally acquiring the cars and 
rail system). It even paid corporate taxes. CTA remained in financial health much 
longer than most transit operations, managing to cover operating expenses (though 
not always its debt service payments) until 1970. After that, it quickly succumbed 
to the inflationary pressures that ruined other transit companies around the country. 
CTA first received fare differentials in 1965 to make up the cost of reduced 
fares for students and seniors. It received general operating subsidies in 1971, 
but apparently did not receive federal operating assistance until 1978. The state 
of Illinois has periodically provided grants to pay down much of CTA's debt 
(essentially making these capital grants). However, it did not want to get directly 
involved in a perpetual bail-out of the system. Instead, the Regional Transit Au-
thority (RTA) was formed in 1974. The CTA, as well as the suburban bus and rail 
systems, were placed under the authority of the RTA. The legislature hoped that, 
by putting transit on a region-wide basis, the provision and funding of mass 
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Figure 1. Chicago: Revenue and expenses. 
transportation would be stabilized. Even after the creation of the RTA, however, 
transit operating deficits continued to increase. At several points in the early 
1980s, it appeared that CIA would not be able to meet its payroll, and rumors 
surfaced that CIA would be shut down. In response to this ongoing financial 
crisis, the RTA itself was reorganized in 1983 (Krambles 1993). 
Although the state of Illinois essentially takes a hand-off approach to transit 
finance, it did set up a sales tax in the six-county Chicago metropolitan region 
which directly benefits the RIA. In addition, the state provides an additional 25 
percent over and above the total revenue collected through the sales tax. These 
moneys are then allocated to the RTA's service boards (CIA, Metra, and PACE). 
Thus, the state does provide significant support to mass transit, but in a some-
what indirect fashion. Furthermore, in recent years, the state has not passed the 
bonds that would have provided matching funds for federal capital grants, add-
ing to the impression that transit in Chicago is a local concern. 
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Figure 2. New York: Revenue and expenses. 
Financial History of the NVCT 
In contrast to Chicago's relative health, New York City's subways have been 
in crisis longer. All three subway systems (the private BMT and IRT and, later, 
the city-run IND) were in severe financial crisis from the 1920s onward. They 
were municipalized in 1940 under Fiorello La Guardia, who assumed that major 
efficiencies of scale would be achieved by combining the systems (Hood 1993 ). 
Just as in Chicago, NYCT was to be run as a business, with no subsidies pro-
vided. Unfortunately, it did not take long for financial problems to resurface, 
certainly, in part, because City officials still would not allow the fare to rise 
above a nickel. 
New York State reorganized the City's Board ofTransportation into the New 
York City Transit Authority in 1953 (Danielson and Doig 1982). However, be-
cause the Authority had no taxing power, this reorganization was of limited use. 
The State, under Governor Nelson Rockefeller, came up with additional funding 
for mass transit, including funds for commuter railroads. While this meant the 
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State was providing some subsidies to New York transit, this was not a stable 
source of funds. It should be noted that the State (along with the City) has been 
very involved in New York's transit problems for some time. There is a much 
closer relationship between the State and the City, though this has been strained 
from time to time, particularly in recent years. Thus, it is not surprising to find 
that the proportion of State aid to New York's transit system has consistently 
been substantial (generally 20 percent). 
In 1968, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was created 
through the merger of NY CT and the Triborough Authority (Danielson and Doig 
1982). The Triborough Authority was in much better financial shape and thus 
was able subsidize transit service. Transit was tied into a regional source of fund-
ing for the first time. Furthermore, transportation planning was rationalized and 
coordinated; problems could be addressed at once, rather than in a piecemeal 
fashion (Danielson and Doig 1982). 
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Unfortunately, the problems were greater than had originally been imag-
ined. By 1970, the subways were running a deficit of $120 million (Danielson 
and Doig 1982). Governor Rockefeller did not approve of federal-local activities 
that bypassed the states and was wary of approaching Washington (Danielson 
1965). However, City officials felt no such hesitation, and they called upon the 
federal government for emergency operating assistance (Danielson and Doig 
1982). New York received federal operating assistance in 197 5 and in every sub-
sequent year. The emergency federal funding became a permanent state of af-
fairs, as many expected it would, though the federal proportion of total revenues 
has declined greatly over the years. 
Analysis of the Systems' Financial Situations 
This analysis of deficits and subsidy levels goes back to the 194 7 creation 
of CIA and the 1953 restructuring of NYCT.2 Given how the transit systems 
have had such different relationships with their respective states, it is hardly 
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surprising that the patterns of subsidies for the two systems are very different. 
CTA has relied much more heavily upon local (or at least regional) financing. It 
is only in the last few years that State assistance has shown up in their reports, 
though the true level of State assistance is clearly somewhat higher than in the 
early Section 15 reports. CTA's reliance on federal funding hovers around 5 per-
cent, which is the same as the industry average. 
New York relied on local funding earlier (as far back as 1960). It had re-
ceived state assistance by 1974 (which, over time, increased to roughly 20 per-
cent of its total revenues) and federal assistance in 197 5. After relying very heavily 
on emergency operating funds from the federal government for several years, 
NYCT's dependence dropped. Currently, federal assistance makes up only 2 per-
cent of its overall operating revenues. Of course, it is worth noting that, due to its 
immense size, New York still receives roughly 40 percent more assistance in 
gross terms than does CTA. (Another way to put the two systems into perspec-
tive is to note that New York's state subsidies alone are often larger than Chicago's 
combined operating revenues.) 
It is true that CTA remained in relative financial health for much longer 
than NYCT. Indeed, CTA was able to meet its operating expenses through pas-
senger revenue until 1971. In the last 20 years, CTA has faced sharp declines in 
operating revenues in constant dollars, though the operating expenses seem to 
have more or less stabilized. In contrast, NYCT now has greater revenues than it 
did in 1954 (in constant dollars). However, its operating costs ballooned throughout 
the 1980s. While New York has certainly had trouble with its expenses, it ap-
pears that it has made dramatic improvements since 1989. By looking at the 
charts of revenues and expenses, one can identify many of the points at which 
the systems got into deep trouble. It appears that both systems faced increasing 
costs in the late 1960s. What might explain such a situation? This period follows 
the introduction of federal capital subsidies but is before federal operating subsi-
dies were authorized in 1974. If it is true that labor costs were driving the cost 
increases, then this must have occurred even without the introduction of operat-
ing subsidies (or at least federal operating subsidies). One plausible explanation 
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is that, in Chicago at least, several route extensions were finally opened up in the 
late 1960s, including the Eisenhower, Dan Ryan, and Kennedy extensions 
(Krambles 1993 ). Of course, these extensions were made possible by the newly 
available federal capital grants. 
However, these years were also extremely bad ones for CTA's ridership. 
Annual ridership decreased from 510.5 million in 1967 to 457 .8 million in 1968. 
There was an additional 34 million passenger drop the next year (perhaps in part 
due to a fare increase). The combination of CTA's expansion of its service area 
with such a sharp drop in its ridership was disastrous. It is hardly surprising that 
CTA was relying upon general operating assistance by 1971. 
Yet the subsidies were never able to stop the disappearance of CTA's pas-
sengers, however. Another large drop occurred between 1980 and 1982, when 
more than 10 percent of the overall passengers and 15 percent of rail passengers 
switched to other modes of transportation. Again, it is quite likely that a 50 
percent increase in the base fare (from $.60 to $.90) triggered at least part of this 
rider flight. To look at the figures in a more positive light, it would be worth 
investigating how CTA managed to cut its expenses so dramatically in 1980 and 
again in 1981. The financial reports indicate that there was a savings of $35 
million in labor costs and associated benefits. If this was a true savings (and not 
accounting wizardry), one would want to see if it could be replicated. CTA's 
costs have remained relatively stable since 1985, so perhaps more attention can 
now be given to the revenue side. 
With respect to the situation in New York, it is clear that their greatest prob-
lems were with the cost side and not necessarily with the passenger revenues. 
Operating costs increased sharply between 1966 (perhaps not coincidentally the 
year of a major transit strike) and 1975. Suddenly, operating costs decreased 
sharply. This may have been due to across-the-board service cutbacks and main-
tenance deferral. In 1980, costs shot up even higher. On the other hand, revenues 
also made a fairly dramatic recovery. Perhaps these figures reflect the steward-
ship of David Gunn, who made major improvements during his tenure at the 
Transit Authority. The costs again decreased from 1989 to 1992, though they 
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crept up again in recent years. Operating costs appear to have dropped again in 
1995. The reasons for this are unclear. 
New York has always had the highest transit share of any city in the U.S., 
largely due to Manhattan's very high population density and unique geographi-
cal features. Transit is essential to New York, and New Yorkers have never been 
able to completely escape using the subway, even at the times they may have 
wanted to. New York's transit use patterns have essentially been cyclical, with 
ridership recovering from periodic declines. While ridership will almost cer-
tainly never reach the level of the late 1950s and early 1960s (with 1.8 billion 
annual passengers), 1995 was the best in several years (with 1.55 billion passen-
gers taking transit). Actually, 1971, 1980, and 1989 were also peak years, much 
like 1995 was. In each of these years, transit ridership was roughly 1.5 billion 
passengers. The lowest years occurred in the late 1970s. In 1976 and 1978, rider-
ship was down to roughly 1.3 billion passengers annually. The fact that so many 
New Yorkers still take transit (in contrast to the severe fall-off in transit use in 
Chicago) means that fare revenues have remained high. This has been one bright 
spot in New York's financial picture. In those years that the MIA was able to 
control costs (such as 1990 and 1991 ), the operating deficit was significantly 
reduced. 
Expenditure of Operating Funds 
The way that these systems disperse their operating funds is reasonably 
similar. For both systems, labor is the primary expense. Both systems spend 
roughly 80 percent on labor, including all salaries and fringe benefits. This has 
been the case since 1980. 3 While labor costs were somewhat lower prior to the 
1960s, labor has always been the single greatest expense for transit systems. 
Materials and supplies are generally the next major expense; over the last 17 
years, they have averaged 7 .5 percent of total operating costs for New York and 
I 0 percent for Chicago. (Of course, the very expensive materials needed for rail 
reconstruction are accounted for as a capital expense.) Utilities have accounted 
for 5 percent of New York's operating costs, on average; they have made up 
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roughly 4 percent of Chicago's costs. Finally, on average, fuel accounts for only 
I percent ofNewYork's costs, while it accounts for 3 percent of Chicago's costs. 
This is less surprising when one considers that New York is heavily oriented 
towards rail transit. 
When looking at operating costs by function (and not object class), it is 
somewhat startling to note that maintenance has been fairly stable. Maintenance 
is nearly always cut back when budgetary shortfalls occur. Over the last 17 years, 
Chicago has spent 12.l percent of its operating funds on non-vehicle mainte-
nance. This amount has been as high as 14. l percent but never below I 0.1 per-
cent (even in 1981, when the system was facing an especially bad fiscal crisis). 
In Table 1, in addition to the average for the last 17 years, the average of the 
last 4 years of available data was included. The reason for this is that the account-
ing categories for what constituted vehicle operations and general administra-
tion was changed. New York 
dropped from spending fully 
30 percent of its operating 
funds on administration to 11 
percent the following year. In 
order to truly compare the two 
systems on administrative 
costs, the last four years seem 
more relevant. Interestingly, 
both systems spend almost 
identical proportions on ve-
hicle operations (50.8 percent 
and 50.6 percent). Looking at 
the last four years only, Chi-
cago spends more on general 
administration. In general, 
Chicago also spends a slightly 
higher proportion of its budget 
Table 1 
Proportion of Total Operating Costs 
New York 
Vehicle Operations 
Vehicle Maintenance 
Non-Vehicle Maintenance 
General Administration 
Chicago 
Vehicle Operations 
Vehicle Maintenance 
Non-Vehicle Maintenance 
General Administration 
Average 
1979-95 
(%) 
40.3 
19.3 
17.2 
23.I 
51.0 
20.1 
12.1 
15.5 
Average 
1992-95 
(%) 
50.8 
17.4 
19.3 
12.1 
50.6 
20.0 
13.2 
13.5 
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on vehicle maintenance and less on non-vehicle maintenance than does New 
York. Again, this is consistent with the CTA being a bus-oriented agency. 
Other Financial Issues 
This paper has largely focused on operating subsidies, in part because they 
are particularly controversial and the funding patterns are so different among 
various systems.4 With capital grants, federal funding is by far the most impor-
tant source across all systems. However, the distinction between operating and 
capital funding is somewhat arbitrary. While the distinction certainly has real 
consequences for transit systems, funding categories can and do shift, generally 
for political reasons. 
Often higher levels of government change the rules for transit agencies. 
This may mean that an "inviolable" transportation trust fund is tapped into dur-
ing a severe fiscal crisis. Similarly, promised funds may not be available. On the 
other hand, a state or federal agency may make funding more flexible, so that 
transit agencies can allocate resources according to their needs. This is the intent 
ofISTEA. 
However, not all funds can be "flexed" between categories. Both CTA and 
NYCT have deferred some kinds of maintenance in favor of shorter term operat-
ing functions. This is one way of moving capital funds over to cover operating 
expenses. Programmed federal funds, especially for ''New Starts" cannot be moved 
about so cavalierly. Unfortunately, even after the implementation of I STEA, the 
funding structure for transit subsidies continues to demonstrate a bias in favor of 
system expansion rather than system maintenance. Given that operating subsi-
dies are being zeroed out, transit operators are forced to devise strategies for 
obtaining capital funding from Washington. In essence, they are looking for a 
"capital fix." One result of this is that transit operators defer maintenance until a 
portion of the system has to be reconstructed-and thus is eligible for federal 
support. This is basically what occurred on Chicago's Green Line, which re-
cently reopened. The strategy is a perfectly rational one, given that transit sys-
tems operate in a resource-constrained environment. Unfortunately, the cost of 
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reconstruction is almost always much higher than what was "saved" by deferring 
maintenance. Indeed, this strategy is not limited to transit operators. Most state 
highway departments are forced to adopt the same tactics, given the capital bias 
in federal funding (Sanders 1995). Making transit funds more "fungible" would 
help avoid these inefficiencies. However, given the chronic shortfall in operating 
funds, transit systems are likely to divert capital funds to operations when pos-
sible. This is a historic pattern, going back to the original owners of private 
transit systems. Thus, a complete analysis of transit funding would have to look 
at the amounts of capital funding channeled to operations, though determining 
the exact amounts is very difficult, given the nature of the financial portion of 
older annual reports. At present, this information has not been compiled. 
Points for Further Research 
Further research into transit subsidies and productivity is necessary before 
one could conclusively demonstrate that it was the subsidies (either operating or 
capital) that accelerated the financial crises of the transit industry in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In order to fully test this hypothesis, one would first need to collect 
several other performance measures, including passenger miles, revenue miles, 
and number of employees. In addition, one would need to determine the metro-
politan population, number of private automobiles (to measure the competition), 
strike activity, and the price of labor, fuel, and capital over these years. Of course, 
one would also need to determine capital funding (and diversions of capital fund-
ing) as well. This extension of the research is currently under way. Still, the 
historical financial information by itself is crucial for determining the major 
fluctuations in the financial situation of either system, which, in tum, will allow 
transportation experts to focus their attention most intently upon these crucial 
moments.•:• 
Endnotes 
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented in Chicago at the May 1997 Metropoli-
tan Conference on Public Transportation Research. The author wishes to thank Prof. 
Ian Savage and two anonymous readers for comments on this paper, as well as the 
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staff of Northwestern's Transportation Library for their assistance in the data collec-
tion process. 
2 Since the first year of operation for each system was only a partial year, this data was 
not included in any charts. 
3 All information in this section comes from Section 15 Reports and thus only covers 
FY 1979 to 1995. 
4 This section, along with additional material on operating expenses, was added on the 
recommendation of an anonymous reviewer. 
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